Introduction
Human language is a unique natural communication system for two reasons. 1 Firstly, the mapping from meanings to signals in language has structural properties that are not found in any other animal's communication systems. In particular, syntax gives us the ability to produce an infinite range of expressions through the dual tools of compositionality and recursion. Compositionality is defined here as the property whereby "the meaning of an expression is a monotonic function of the meaning of its parts and the way they are put together." (Cann 1993:4) Recursion is "the phenomenon by which a constituent of a sentence dominates another instance of the same syntactic category . . . recursion is the principle reason that the number of sentences in a natural language is normally taken to be infinite" (Trask 1993:229-230) . Together with recursion' compositionality is the reason that this infinite set of sentences can be used to express different meanings.
Secondly, at least some of the content of this mapping is learned by children through observation of others' use of language. This seems not to be true of most, maybe all, of animal communication (see review in Oliphant, this volume) . In this chapter I formally investigate the interaction of these two unique properties of human language: the way it is learned and its syntactic structure.
Evolution without natural selection
Evolutionary linguistics is currently a growing field of research tackling the origins of human language (Bickerton 1990; Pinker & Bloom 1990; Newmeyer 1991; Hurford et al. 1998) . Of particular interest to many researchers is the origins of syntactic structure. Perhaps the dominant approach to the evolution of this structure is expounded by Pinker & Bloom (1990) ; they suggest that the best way to view human language is as a biological adaptation that evolved in response to the need to communicate "propositional structures over a serial interface" (p. 707). In their (and many linguists) view, syntax is more or less fully specified by an innate (and therefore genetically determined) language acquisition device (LAD) which significantly constrains the language learner with prior knowledge about the nature of language.
"Evolutionary theory offers clear criteria for when a trait should be attributed to natural selection: complex design for some function, and the absence of alternative processes capable of explaining such complexity. Human language meets these criteria." (Pinker & Bloom 1990:707) In this chapter I agree that the structure of the human learning mechanism(s) will bring particular prior biases to bear on the acquisition task. Indeed there are good theoretical reasons why this must be the case for any learner that can generalise (e.g. Mitchell 1997 ). However, because language is unique (an autapomorphy in biological terms) we should search very carefully for "alternative processes" before turning to natural selection as an explanation. In fact, recent work of which this chapter is a continuation, (Batali 1998; Kirby 1998b; Kirby 1998c; Hurford 1998; Batali, this volume; Hurford, this volume) has suggested that some of the complex structure of language may be the result of a quite different process from biological evolution. This work shows that learning influences the dynamic process of language transmission, historically, from one generation to the next. In many ways this approach is mirrored in the recent work of linguists from quite different research perspectives (e.g. Niyogi & Berwick 1995; Niyogi & Berwick 1997; Christiansen & Devlin 1997; Briscoe 1997) . This chapter aims to demonstrate that, for any reasonable learning bias, basic structural properties of language such as recursion and compositionality will inevitably emerge over time through the complex dynamical process of social transmission -in other words, without being built in to a highly constraining innate language acquisition device.
A computational approach
If we are to understand the ways in which a learned, socially transmitted, system such as language can evolve we need some sophisticated models of learners embedded in a dynamic context. Verbal theorising about the likely behaviour of complex dynamical systems is often not good enough. As Niyogi & Berwick (1997) point out, our intuitions about the evolution of even simple dynamical systems are often wrong. Recently, many researchers have responded to this problem by taking a computational perspective (e.g. Hurford 1989; Hurford 1991; MacLennan 1991; Batali 1994; Oliphant 1996; Cangelosi & Parisi 1996; Steels 1996; Kirby & Hurford 1997b; Briscoe 1997) . This methodology provides a third way between verbal theorising on the one hand and on the other, analytical mathematical approaches -which tend to prove difficult to formulate for these types of system. This chapter follows on from this line of research, developing a working computational simulation of individuals capable of learning to communicate by observing each other's behaviour, and tracking the development of the artificial languages that emerge in the population.
The rest of this chapter is divided into three main sections. Firstly, the computational model is described in some detail, with particular attention being paid to the process of learning (although some details are left to an appendix). The next section deals with two representative experiments with the model dealing with the emergence of compositionality given simple semantics, and with the emergence of recursive subordinate clauses given a more complex semantic space. Finally, an explanation of the behaviour of the simulation is given in theoretical terms along with a discussion of the impact of these results on linguistic theory. 
A working model of linguistic transmission
Language exists in two different domains (Chomsky 1986; Hurford 1987; Kirby 1998a ):
I-language This is (internal) language as represented in the brains of the population. It is the language user's knowledge of language.
E-language This is the (external) language that exists as utterances in the arena of use (Hurford 1987).
These two domains of language influence each other in profound ways via the process of linguistic transmission diagrammed in figure 1. E-language is a product of the I-language of speakers. However, the I-language of language learners is a product of the E-language that they have access to. A model of the constraints on these two domains and the transformations that map between them should be sufficient to determine the dynamical properties of linguistic transmission. A computational simulation of linguistic transmission works within the framework shown in figure 2, an elaboration of the model in figure 1. The simulation implements these processes:
1. An individual in the simulation is given a set of meanings that must be expressed.
These meanings can be thought of as being provided by the external "world", but in the simulation will simply be chosen randomly from some predefined set.
2. The individual then attempts to express each meaning either using its own internalised knowledge of language or by some random process of invention.
3. A new learner takes this set of utterances and uses it as input to learning.
4. Finally, the learner becomes a new speaker the old speaker is discarded and a new individual is added to become a new learner and the cycle repeats.
The utterances that the individuals produce and learn from in these simulations are pairs of strings of letters (which can be thought of as basic unanalysable phonemic segments) and meaning representations. In these simulations the world is made up of a set of predefined atomic concepts. These might include:
john tiger eats fears knows
These concepts can be combined into simple predicate-argument propositions, which may have hierarchical structure. For example:
fears(john,tiger) knows(john,eats(tiger,john)) So, an example utterance by an individual in the simulation that happened to know something like English might be the pair: < tigereatsjohn; eats(tiger,john) > Obviously the biggest component of the simulation will be the part that takes sets of pairs such as these and is able to learn from them in some useful way -in other words, the part of the simulation that takes instances of E-language and maps them into I-language. This is the subject of the next section.
Learning
For simulations such as the one presented in this chapter, which model many generations of speakers and acquirers, the design of the learning algorithm is crucial. Two important criteria for a learning algorithm for us are: efficiency, because the simulations will need to model thousands of learners over time; and ease of analysis, since we are interested in how the language evolves over time and it is therefore important to be able to easily inspect the internal states of the learners.
The algorithm presented here 2 has been designed specifically with simulation tasks in mind -it is extremely simple and efficient, and it enables the internal states of learners to be easily analysed. Although no claims are made here for its efficacy as a practical grammar induction tool, it does model in a simple way the dual processes of rote learning of examples and induction of generalisations that must be at the core of any model of language acquisition.
Grammatical representation
For these simulations, the hypothesis space that the learning algorithm searches consists of context-free grammars enriched with the kind of simple semantics described above. It is important to realise that although the internal knowledge of the individuals is a type of context-free grammar, this does not mean that compositionality or recursion is built-in. Consider a learner that can produce the string tigereatsjohn meaning eats(tiger,john).
Here are two (of many, many possible) grammars that this learner could have internalised:
The S symbol in these grammars is the start symbol, whereas the N and V are arbitrarily named non-terminals. The lower case letters are shorthand for preterminals that expand to atomic phonemic segments. The material following the slashes attached to non-terminals is the semantic representation for that non-terminal. 3 The grammar on the left is the simplest grammar that could produce the utterance. Basically, it states that "tigereatsjohn" is a valid sentence meaning eats(tiger,john). Notice that this is entirely non-compositional -in no way is the meaning of the whole a function of meanings of its parts. In fact the string is not broken down or analysed at all, instead it is simply treated as a holistic chunk.
The grammar on the right, however, is compositional. The sub-parts of the string each are assigned meanings. So, for example, tiger corresponds to the meaning tiger. The whole string is composed by piecing these substrings together and combining their meanings using the variables x, p, and y.
It should be clear from this example, that although the grammatical formalism (obviously) allows us to represent languages that are structured syntactically, it does not constrain languages to be of this form. In other words, the space of languages that the learners have access to includes many that would not be considered possible human languages because, for example, they are non-compositional. The choice of formalism therefore does not build-in the result we are looking for.
Rule subsumption
In the first stage of learning, the grammar contains no rules. Data is presented to the the inducer as a pairing of a string of terminals and a semantic structure. A single pair can be incorporated into the grammar rather trivially. Say the pair < tigereatssausages; eats(tiger,sausages) > is to be incorporated. The simplest rule that covers this "fact" about the language to be induced is:
S=eats(tiger,sausages) ! tigereatssausages
A trivial learning algorithm could involve gathering one of these language facts for every string-meaning pair presented and storing them as one big grammar. This would give us a grammar which can generate exactly and only the sentences in the input. We could add one simple refinement to this technique by deleting duplicate rules in the grammar. In fact these two basic operations -incorporation, and duplicate deletion -are at the core of the final induction algorithm used by the simulation.
The problem with using just these two operations is that the inducer has no power to generalise. As such, this is a rather poor model of learning. A basic strategy for extracting generalisations from rules that are overly specific (similar in some ways to the more general method used in some inductive logic programming -see, e.g. discussion and citations in Mitchell 1997) is to take pairs of rules and look for the least-general generalisation that can be made that subsumes them within some prespecified constraints. For example, imagine a grammar with these two rules:
S=eats(tiger,sausages) ! tigereatssausages S=eats(john,sausages) ! johneatssausages What is the least general rule that would subsume both of these? Firstly, we need to replace tiger and john in the semantics with a variable. So the left hand side becomes: S=eats(x; sausages). But this means we need a nonterminal with an x attached to it in the right hand side of the rule. If we replace tiger and john on the right hand sides with a single new category (let's call it N), the we have our new rule:
S=eats(x,sausages) ! N=x eatssausages
We can now delete the original two rules because we have one that subsumes them both. N=mary ! mary M=mary ! mary then a rule that subsumes these two will simply choose one of the non terminal category symbols N or M. Let us say that it chooses to replace M with N, 4 then to keep the induction preservative we must rewrite all occurrences of M throughout the grammar with N.
The induction algorithm thus proceeds by taking an utterance, incorporating the simplest possible rule that generates that utterance directly, and then searches through all pairs of rules in the grammar for possible subsumptions like the ones described above until no further generalisations can be found, and finally deletes any duplicate rules that are left over. More details about the algorithms for rule-subsumption and the constraints on its application can be found in the appendix to this chapter.
Invention
The particular meanings of the sentences that the speakers produce is controlled by the experimenter. The space of possible meanings can be thought of as the population's "world model", in other words, what they want to talk about. One way to think of it is that the world compels the speaker to try to produce a string for a certain meaning. This means that there is no guarantee that the speaker will have a way of generating a string for the meaning it is compelled to produce. This will be especially true of the early stages of any simulation run, since the initial population is initialised with no grammatical knowledge at all.
If there was no way for speakers to produce strings in the absence of a grammar that can generate them, then a language could never get off the ground. It is important, therefore, that our model of an individual be enriched to allow for invention. The invention process is essentially a mechanism for introducing random new words for chunks of meaning, but it should not build in new syntactic structure. In other words, we assume that the individuals are able to invent strings of sounds but are not able to spontaneously invent hierarchical structure that they have not observed.
The invention algorithm used here, given a meaning that the speaker does not have a way of producing, tries to find the closest meaning that the speaker does have a way of producing. With this new meaning, a string and a parse tree for that string can be generated. The parse tree will show the parts of the string that correspond to the "wrong" parts of the meaning -in other words, the parts of the near meaning that are different to the meaning that should have been produced. These parts of string are excised, and replaced with a random sequence of symbols. 5 Finally, the speaker's induction algorithm "hears" its own invented string/meaning pair (this ensures that the speaker's output is consistent).
An example should make this clearer. Imagine that a speaker has the following grammar:
This speaker is then asked to produce a string for the meaning loves(john,anna). The nearest meanings to this that the speaker can produce strings for are loves(john,mary) or loves(john,jane). We'll pick the first, which produces the tree structure:
The wrong part of this tree is the material dominated by the node that introduces the meaning mary. We therefore delete the string mary and replace this with a random sequence of characters. So, the invented string for the meaning loves(john,anna) might be johnlovesspog.
A second example demonstrates an important property of the algorithm which avoids the introduction of novel structure. We'll use the same grammar, but instead try and invent a string for the meaning loves(fred,mary). The nearest meaning to this one using the grammar is loves(john,mary), which generates the same tree as above. This time the wrong bit of meaning is john, which dominates the whole string. An invented string for loves(fred,mary), therefore, might be something like bling.
Summary of simulation cycle
In general the simulation can contain a population of any number of individuals, but to keep things simple in the experiments described here, there are only ever two individuals at any one time: an adult speaker and a new learner. At the start of any simulation run, neither the speaker nor the learner has any grammar at all -in other words, they have no knowledge of language. This means that any language that is observed in the simulation is purely emergent from the interactions of the individuals in the simulation.
Each generation in the simulation goes through the following steps:
1. The speaker tries to produce a set of utterances that will form input to the learner. This involves repeating the following sequence of actions some number of times (set by the experimenter):
(a) The speaker is given a meaning chosen at random from a predefined set.
(b) If the speaker is able to generate a string for that meaning using its grammar, it does so, otherwise it invents a string. 6 If the speaker has invented a string, the speaker uses that string-meaning pair as input to induction. This means that, if an individual invents a new way of saying something, they will learn from that and use that invention again if the need arises.
(c) The learner is given the string, and tries to parse it with any grammar it might have. If it is unable to parse the string, then it takes the string-meaning pair and uses it as input to induction.
2. The speaker's grammar is logged and then it is deleted from the simulation.
3. The learner becomes the new speaker, and a new learner with a blank grammar is added to the simulation.
The two main parameters that the experimenter can vary in this model are: the number of utterances that the speaker will be called upon to produce in its lifetime, and the structure and size of the meaning space. In the discussion section of this chapter we will see that these two parameters bear upon each other in an interesting way.
Example experiments
This section describes in detail two experiments which demonstrate that interesting linguistic structure emerges from nothing over time in the cycle of acquisition and use. Each experiment has been run many times with differing initial random-number "seeds". In each case similar results were achieved although the specific details of the languages that emerged differ in trivial ways.
Degree-0 compositionality
In the first simulation run we experiment with the properties of languages that emerge when the individuals only communicate about simple meanings. The meaning space is made up of simple degree-0 two-place predicates (i.e. predicates with no embedding) in a world with 5 possible "objects" and five possible "actions". Example meanings are:
likes(gavin,mary) loves(mary,john) hates(heather,pete) and so on...
For ease of coding, the arguments of the predicates must be distinct -in other words, reflexives like loves(john,john) are not allowed. Each speaker produces 50 utterances in a lifetime, each of which is chosen at random from this space of two-place predicates. This means that, even if the meanings were carefully chosen, rather than being picked at random, learners can not ever be exposed to the entire range of possible meanings.
Here is a typical first generation grammar (nonterminals except for the start nonterminal S are arbitrarily chosen capital letters):
Generation 1 S=hates(heather,pete) ! yya S=admires(x,john) ! f A=x A=mary ! lg A=pete ! nv This is the grammar of the very first speaker at the end of life. The reason the speaker has any grammar at all is down to the fact that every utterance that it invents it also uses for its own induction. The grammar is essentially an idiosyncratic vocabulary for a random subset of the meaning space. So, for example, the speaker's sentence corresponding to the English "Gavin hates John" is jrx, whereas the sentence for "Gavin likes John" is the completely unrelated w. This, then is a non-compositional, non-syntactically structured communication system. Notice, however, that a chance similarity of two sentences -flg meaning admires(mary,john) and fnv meaning admires(pete,john) -has lead to the creation of an A category for mary and pete.
Further on in this same simulation, we have grammars such as this one:
Generation 14 Now the category B can clearly be thought of as a verb. There are two nominal categories C and A, giving us two types of expression for most of the objects in the semantic space as shown in the There are now only two sentence rules. The first sentence rule gives us an OVS language, with the object nouns of type 1, and the subject nouns of type 2. In the other sentence rule, the word order is OSV. Interestingly, the two types of noun have switched roles, so the object nouns are of type 2, and the subject nouns are type 1.
This form of the language is fairly stable, losing the type 2 form of gavin, but otherwise remaining the same for thousands of generations. Eventually, however, the language goes through a rapid and complex series of changes to end up with the following form, which only has one type of noun: This result is fairly typical of the simulation run started with different random-number seeds. The language in the population evolves from an idiosyncratic vocabulary for complex meanings to a completely compositional syntax with nominal and verbal categories. The main variation between runs is how quickly the coverage of the basic categories becomes complete. Sometimes an idiosyncratic sentence rule for a particular action, or particular object survives for a long time, and occasionally optionality in word order emerges and appears to be stable.
Infinite language, finite means
The simulation in the previous section used a finite meaning space, with five actions and five objects. This translates to 100 possible meanings (5 predicates x 5 possible 1st arguments x 4 possible 2nd arguments 7 ). The next step is to expand the meaning space so that there is an infinite range of meanings that may be expressed. To do this we include predicates which may take other predicates as arguments. The simulation is run again with five "embedding predicates" (such as know, say etc.) Each speaker tries to produce 50 degree-0 meanings as before, but also then tries to produce 50 degree-1 meanings and finally, 50 degree-2 meanings. 8 The first generation grammars for a simulation starting with these parameters are very large (over 100 rules), because there are three times as many utterances to be produced).
Here is a small subset of a typical first generation grammar for this new set of conditions:
Firstly, notice that the vocabulary obviously includes more complex meanings such as says(mary,thinks(mary,praises(john,gavin))) (in English "Mary says she thinks that John praises Gavin"). As with the last simulation runs, the inducer has already done some work. So, the similarity between the sentences mpd meaning knows(pete,admires(mary,heather)) and mmd meaning knows(pete,knows(john,loves(john,mary))) has lead to the creation of a category B for admires(mary,heather) and knows(john,loves(john,mary)).
The grammars in the simulation rapidly increase in size and complexity, peaking in the mid 200's in terms of number of rules, and they also are quickly able to express the full range of degree-0 meanings using regular sentence rules rather like those that emerged in the simulation runs in the previous section. However, after some time the grammars typically reduce dramatically in size: There are two sentence rules in this grammar, and three other categories. The second sentence rule is similar to the ones we saw in the previous section, allowing the language to express the full range of degree-0 sentences. The category A is a verbal category, and B is the nominal category. This language has VOS order in main clauses.
The other sentence rule is the one that allows the language to express meanings greater than degree-0. It introduces a category C for verbs that have a subordinating function (such as fdbtl meaning says), and crucially has a category S on its right hand side. This means that the language is recursive, allowing it to build up an infinite range of meanings. The tree in figure 3 shows how this particular language copes with complex meanings. It displays the parse for the sentence stlwrkazgpfd which, translated into English, means "Pete knows that John loves Mary". Again, the language in the simulation has evolved simply by being learned and used repeatedly by individuals in the population. An initially random, idiosyncratic non-compositional S=p(x; q) and relatively inexpressive communication system, has become a compact, compositional language with nominal and verbal categories, word order encoding meaning distinctions and recursive subordinate clauses allowing the speakers to express an infinite range of meanings. The obvious next question is why?
Bottlenecks and universal grammar
The individuals in the simulation simply observe each other's behaviour and learn from it, occasionally inventing, at random, new behaviours of their own. From this apparent randomness, organisation emerges. Given that so little is built into the simulation, why is compositional, recursive syntax inevitable? To answer this question we need to look back at how languages persist over time in a population (figure 1). We can divide up I-language into units -replicators -that may or may not persist through time. The persistence of an I-language in this view is related to the success of the replicators that make up that language. In other words, the languages which are more easily transmitted from generation to generation will persist.
Within a population, certain replicators actually compete for survival. That is, the success of one must be measured relative to the success of others in the population at that time. These competing replicators are those rules which potentially express the same meaning. If there are two ways of saying John loves Mary, then on a particular exposure to this meaning, the learner can obviously only hear one of them. Therefore, on one exposure, only one of the rules (or, more properly, set of rules) that can be used to express John loves Mary has a chance of being induced by the learner.
At face value, it would seem that the two competing rules (or rule-sets) will have an equal chance of being the one chosen for producing the meaning, so the replicative success of all rules in a language should be equal. This would be true if each rule only ever expressed one meaning. However, if one rule can be used to express more meanings than another, then, all other things being equal, that rule will have a greater chance of being expressed in the I-Language E-Language
I-Language
The Bottleneck Figure 4 : The E-language domain acts as a bottleneck on the transmission of I-language.
E-language input to the learner. In this case, the more general rule is the better replicator.
For a more concrete example, consider a situation where, in the population of I-languages, there are two competing rules. One is a rule that expresses John loves Mary as an unanalysed string of symbols -essentially as one word. The other rule expresses John loves Mary as a string of symbols, but can also be used to express any meaning where someone loves Mary. So, the latter rule can also be used to express Gavin loves Mary and so on. Further imagine that both rules have an equal chance of being used to express John loves Mary. The more general rule is still a better replicator, because for any randomly chosen set of meanings, we can expect it to be used more often than the idiosyncratic rule. Its chances of survival to the next generation are far more secure than the idiosyncratic rule.
Of course, the more general rule will not be learned as easily as the idiosyncratic rule. In the simulations described above, an idiosyncratic pairing of one meaning to one form takes only one exposure to learn, but the most general rule takes several. However, the idiosyncratic rule only covers one meaning, whereas the most general rule covers an infinite number. It is clear, therefore, that the probability of a acquiring a particular rule given a random sample of meanings increases with the generality of that rule. The success of Ilanguages which contain general rules seems secure. The picture that emerges, then, is of the language of the population acting as an adaptive system in its own right. Initially, the rules are minimally general, each pairing one string with one meaning. At some point, a chance invention will lead a learner to "go beyond the data" in making a generalisation that the previous generation had not made. This generalisation will then compete with the idiosyncratic rule(s) for the same meaning(s). Given that generalisations are better replicators, the idiosyncratic rules will be pushed out over time. The competition will then be replayed amongst generalisations, always with the more general rules surviving. (Notice that this picture of a move from holistic protolanguage to an emergent syntactic system is similar to the one proposed by Wray (1998) .)
The inevitable end state of this process is a language with a syntax that supports compositionally derived semantics in a highly regular fashion. The grammar for such a language appears to be the shortest (in terms of numbers of rules) that can express the entire meaning space. The shorter the grammar, the higher the generality of each of the rules -the shortest grammar that can still do the job of expressing meanings is therefore the one made up of optimal replicators.
Figure 5: Two Venn diagrams showing the different approaches to explaining observed constraints on cross-linguistic variation. E is the set of all logically possible languages, the gray area signifies the set of occurring human languages. In the top diagram, the Chomskyan language acquisition device constrains the learner directly and nothing else is required to explain the limits on variation. In the bottom diagram, the language learning device is less constraining, and the particular characteristics of human languages are the end result of a historical evolution of languages in populations (represented by arrows).
We can think of the transformations between I-and E-language as a bottleneck on the transmission of language over time (see figure 4) . Since the number of meanings that the learners are exposed to is always lower than the total number of meanings, a totally idiosyncratic language cannot survive. Compositional recursive languages logically can be the only possible languages that will pass through the bottleneck unchanged.
At the start of this chapter the approach taken here was contrasted with the dominant approach in evolutionary linguistics, where the structure of language is taken to match closely with the structure of the language faculty which in turn is shaped by natural selection. We can now more precisely unpack the differences between these two perspectives on the origins of syntax. In particular, the relationship between the model of the acquirer and constraints on cross-linguistic variation are quite different.
Traditionally, the Chomskyan language acquisition device (LAD) directly constrains what makes a possible human language by limiting directly what can or cannot be acquired. This limit is said to closely map the observed constraints on variation (Hoekstra & Kooij 1988) . Part of the generative research program involves accounting for variation between languages explicitly within the model of the language acquirer. In fact, Universal Grammar (UG) and the LAD are often treated as synonymous within this tradition. It is not generally considered that the dynamics of language acquisition and use impose further constraints within the boundaries imposed by the structure of the LAD (although see Niyogi & Berwick 1995; Clark 1996 for interesting exceptions).
Figure 5 contrasts this view with that proposed in this paper. The language learning device clearly does impose constraints directly in a similar fashion -there are certain types of language that the learner simply cannot acquire -however these constraints are far less severe than those imposed by the LAD. As can be seen in the initial stages of the simulation, very un-language like systems can be acquired by this learner. The constraints on variation are not built into the learner, but are instead emergent properties of the social dynamics of learned communication systems and the structure of the semantic space that the individuals wish to express.
The theory presented here gives us a neat explanation of why human languages use syntactic structure to compositionally derive semantics, have recursive subordination to express infinite distinctions in a digital way, have words with major syntactic categories such as noun and verb, and use structural relations (such as word order) to encode meaning distinctions. However, it does not seem to allow us to understand more specific universals. For example, why particular constituent orders are far more frequent than others across the languages of the world (Hawkins 1983; Dryer 1992) .
Perhaps the best explanation for these types of universal should look at the effect of parsing and generation in the transmission of replicators (see Kirby 1998a; Kirby 1997 for details). On the other hand, at least some of these word order constraints may eventually be explained in terms of linguistic adaptation without appealing to processing (see, Christiansen 1994; Christiansen & Devlin 1997 for some suggestions along these lines). X-bar theory -a sub part of UG which constrains the structure of syntactic trees cross categorially (Jackendoff 1977 ) -has been implicated in various word order universals. Daniel Nettle suggests that X-bar is just the sort of over-arching generalisation that the theory put forward in this chapter predicts. It can be characterised as a pair of phrase structure rules:
XP ! Spec X 0 or XP ! X 0 Spec X 0 ! X Y P or X 0 ! Y P X These rules are like standard context free rules except that X and Y are variables that can range over the lexical categories in the language.
This use of variables in phrase structure rules is not possible with the formalism adopted here, so this result is not possible in the simulation. Nevertheless, if the language learning device were able to make a generalisation such as that expressed by X-bar, we would expect it to thrive as a replicator. More generally, we should expect languages to behave in such a way that their word orders can be expressed in the most compact way, since this will reflect the behaviour of the optimal, most general, replicator. Dryer (1992) shows with a large-scale cross-linguistic survey, that this is indeed the case; languages tend to order their non-branching nodes on the same side of their branching nodes across the phrasal categories of the language.
Conclusion
Compositionality and recursion are arguably the most basic features of the syntax of language. These structural properties, along with the way it is transmitted, are what makes human language a unique natural communication system. For a language to survive from generation to generation it must be learned by individuals observing the behaviour of other individuals. The sample of observations will be finite, yet the range of meanings that individuals may wish to communicate about is likely to be very large or infinite. The simulations here have shown three things:
1. Languages transmitted through time via observational learning evolve.
2. For a language to survive it must be syntactic. That is, it must have internal structure.
For complex meanings this structure will be compositional and recursive.
3. Compositional and recursive languages are achievable end-states of the cultural evolution of language, even when the start-state is no language at all.
A set of requirements for a syntactically communicating organism can be drawn up. We should expect, given the model described here, syntax to emerge in a population of organisms with:
hierarchical internal representations, a need to communicate those representations, the ability, at least some of the time, to be able to guess what those representations actually are in a speaker, and an ability to make generalisations over observed instances.
It remains a topic for further research the extent to which humans fulfill this list of requirements and other animals do not. However, we can conclude further that in order to explain the origins of syntax we need appeal to neither: a single mutation, or gradual biological change, whose selective fitness is due to it giving us syntax, nor a mechanism whereby the specifically communicative function of language directly impacts upon its evolution.
